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TSCA LIABILITY IN COURT: IS IGNORANCE
BLISS OR WILL A STRICT LIABILITY
STANDARD BE THE RESULT?
INTRODUCTION
On December 7, 1983, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") charged Huth Oil Company with violations of the Toxic
Substances Control Act ("TSCA" or "the Act").' The violations resulted
from the Company's improper use, marking and recordkeeping of a waste oil
tank which contained violative levels of PCBs.2 On May 15, 1983 EPA
amended the charges by adding as a defendant, Joyce Nichols, one of the
Company's bookkeepers, based solely upon her ownership of the property
where the violations occurred. 3 Because EPA provided evidence that clearly
established the violations, liability for Ms. Nichols rested on a single issue:
whether the simple ownership of the property in violation of the statute es-
tablishes liability under TSCA. The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") ad-
judicating for Region V of the EPA held that Ms. Nichols was not liable.4
In his June 2, 1986 decision, the ALJ stated that, "the Toxic Substances
Control Act is not a strict liability statute" and "that Ms. Nichols' bare title
to the ... property ... is insufficient to hold her liable." 5
On March 19, 1986 (three months earlier), an ALJ for Region VII of the
EPA rendered a contrary opinion in Garden City Unified School District
#457. 6 The ALJ held that the respondent, Garden City Unified School Dis-
trict #457, was in violation of TSCA based on a failure to adequately in-
spect all school buildings and locate all friable material by June 28, 1983.'
1. In re Huth, No. TSCA-V-C-196 (initial decision, June 2, 1986) at 3.
2. Id. at 3. PCBs or Polychlorinated biphenyls are used "for their chemical stability, fire
resistance, and electrical resistance properties. They are frequently used in electrical trans-
formers and capacitors. However, PCBs are extremely toxic to humans and wildlife .... Epi-
demiological data and experiments on laboratory animals indicate that exposure to PCBs pose
carcinogenic and other risks to humans." Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 636 F.2d
1267, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
3. Huth, at 4. "The mentioned property was conveyed by George J. Huth to Respon-
dent, Joyce Nichols, by quit-claim deed, dated November 29, 1983." Id. at 5.
4. Huth, at 25-26.
5. Id. See infra note 73.
6. In re GARDEN CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 457, No. TSCA-VII-84-T-273 (ini-
tial decision, Mar. 19, 1986).
7. Id. at 15. "'Friable material' means any material applied to ceilings, walls, structural
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Upon the discovery of friable asbestos-containing material, the ALJ held
that the respondent was in violation of recordkeeping, notice and clean-up
regulations as promulgated under TSCA.' In its defense, the school district
contended that the failure to discover the friable material relieved the district
of a duty to comply with the regulations until the actual date of the asbestos
discovery.9 Underlying this argument was the district's assertion that they
lacked the requisite intent to violate the statute. The ALJ, however, rejected
the defense and stated that "[i]ntent to violate is not an element of any viola-
tion for which civil penalties are assessed." 10
In sum, the Garden City decision supports the application of a strict liabil-
ity standard by holding that intent is not an element of a violation of TSCA.
However, the contemporaneous Huth decision contradicts Garden City's
holding by expressly rejecting strict liability. This split at the administrative
level suggests that EPA's interpretation of TSCA's standard of liability is in
a state of confusion. This Comment addresses the confusion and urges its
resolution in federal court.
A fundamental element of statutory enforcement is the establishment of
liability. Furthermore, the determination of the statutory standard of liabil-
ity is critical in establishing actual liability. Several standards of liability
exist, including: strict liability and negligence."' The application of a stan-
dard to a statute will greatly affect the scope of the statute. 2 For example, a
strict liability standard expands the scope of the statute, because a violation
does not require actual intent. On the other hand, a negligence standard
constricts the scope because a violation requires the breach of a reasonable
members, piping, ductwork or any other part of the building structure which, when dry, may
be crumbled, pulverized, or reduced to a powder by hand pressure." 40 C.F.R. § 763.105
(1988). After the discovery of "friable material," a school must sample and analyze the mate-
rial for the presence of asbestos. 40 C.F.R. §§ 763.107-763.109 (1988).
8. Garden City, at 15.
9. Id. at 16.
10. Id. at 15.
11. "'Strict liability'... means liability that is imposed on an actor apart from either (1)
an intent to interfere with a legally protected interest without a legal justification for doing so,
or (2) a breach of a duty to exercise reasonable care .... W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE
LAW OF TORTS 534 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER]. "Negligence is the failure to use
such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would use under the circumstances .... "
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (5th ed. 1979). This Comment will also refer to "negligence"
when describing statutory intent-based liability. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
However, in a pure common law tort discussion the distinction between an intentional tort and
negligence would be made. PROSSER, at 33.
12. See generally Dechert & Smith, Environmental Liability and Economic Incentives For
Hazardous Waste Management, 25 Hous. L. REV. 935, 936 (1988) (stating that "[tihe greatest
uncertainty is that of not knowing what treatment standard will be enforced in the future, and
therefore we cannot know what potential liability the firm may face.").
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standard of care. Therefore, the determination of the standard of liability is
of crucial importance to both the effective enforcement of a statute (i.e., who
legitimate actions are brought against), and the public's proper statutory
compliance (i.e., what standard of care the statute requires).
A clear determination of the standard of liability is most important where
a statute seeks to protect the public health and safety. Under such statutes, a
strict or negligence standard greatly affects whether the best care or only
reasonable care protects the public, and whether a lack of knowledge shields
a defendant from liability.13 For example, under a negligence system the
regulated community will be discouraged from using the best safety meas-
ures because only a reasonable care standard is required. Furthermore, be-
cause negligence requires intent, the community will be encouraged to
remain ignorant of potential hazards to the public welfare. Therefore, a neg-
ligence standard creates increased risk for the public.14
An example of a statute enacted to protect the public health and safety is
the Toxic Substances Control Act.15 Congress enacted TSCA in 1976 "to
regulate chemical substances and mixtures which present an unreasonable
risk of injury to health or the environment."' 16 However, as evidenced by the
Huth and Garden City decisions, the question remains: what is the correct
13. The legislature, within its constitutional powers, may see fit to place the burden
of injuries 'upon those who can measurably control their causes, instead of upon
those who are in the main helpless in that regard.' In such a case the defendant may
become liable on the mere basis of his violation of the statute. No excuse is recog-
nized, and neither reasonable ignorance nor all proper care will avoid liability. Such
a statute falls properly under the head of strict liability, rather than any basis of
negligence ....
PROSSER, supra note 11, at 227.
14. A strict liability standard produces "a stronger incentive than under fault liability
rules to compare the costs of damage payments with the costs of abating the environmental
pollution by switching product lines (e.g., redesigning a product to eliminate a hazardous
chemical) or by reducing the level of use of damaging product inputs and production
processes." F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION: LAW AND POLICY 636 (1984) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION].
15. The Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (1988). See also Gaynor,
The Toxic Substances Control Act: A Regulatory Morass, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1150 (1977) [here-
inafter TSCA: A Regulatory Morass]. TSCA provides the EPA "broad authority to regulate the
manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, and disposal of chemical substances
and mixtures." Id. Gaynor, TSCA: Significant Developments in 1988, 1989 ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY: ENVTL. L. 39, 40. In 1987, "30% of all civil cases filed by the [Environ-
mental Protection] Agency were under TSCA and the program collected fines totalling 4.7
million dollars that were only 30 percent less than the Water program, EPA's highest penalty
generating program." Id.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2)(1988). See also TSCA: A Regulatory Morass, supra note 15, at
1150. Congress enacted TSCA because of "the need for authority requiring the testing of
chemicals to determine their health and environmental effects, restricting the use and distribu-
tion of some chemicals when necessary to protect human health and the environment, and
1990]
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standard of TSCA liability? The question arises from (1) the lack of statu-
tory clarity, and (2) the confusion over inconsistent administrative adjudica-
tion. The lack of clarity results from Congress' failure to include express
"strict liability" language in the statute, and the confusion results from the
failure of the courts to harmonize inconsistent administrative decisions inter-
preting TSCA liability.
Absent clear statutory language, the determination of TSCA's standard of
liability is a role for the courts. This Comment contends that TSCA liability
should be strict liability. However, with the split at the administrative level
and the judicial doctrine of deference to agency decision-making, a strict
liability standard is far from absolute. The leading case addressing the judi-
cial review of agency statutory interpretation is Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc. 17 Accordingly, this Comment will apply
the Chevron analysis to the issue at hand.
In 1984, the Supreme Court asserted its position on judicial deference to
agency decision-making in Chevron. In this case, the Court upheld the valid-
ity of regulations adopted by the EPA defining a "stationary source" in the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, and established a general formula for
the judicial review of agency statutory interpretation. The Chevron analysis
involves a two-step formula."8 The first step requires the court to determine
whether the intent of Congress is clear. "If a court, employing traditional
tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on
providing for the development of adequate data on the environmental and health effects of
chemicals." Id.
17. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of
Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron's Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 255 (1988) (stating that
Chevron "has been cited more than 600 times in the three and a half years since it was decided
in June 1984. The case has been described by Judge Kenneth W. Starr as 'one of the most
important administrative law decisions in recent memory' and by Professor Ronald M. Levin
as 'the leading case on the subject... of deference to [administrative] agencies on... issues" of
statutory interpretation. (citations omitted)).
Section 19 of TSCA provides for the judicial review of administrative orders using a "sub-
stantial evidence" standard; however, it is unlikely to be controlling when applied to the legal
issue of TSCA's standard of liability. See 15 U.S.C. § 2618(c)(1988). Caselaw holds that "this
rule [TSCA section 19] does not include the agency's determination of legal questions."
United States Environmental Protection Agency v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 826 F.2d
361, 364 (5th Cir. 1987) (reviewing an administrative order assessing penalties under TSCA,
where the legal issue arose whether transformers in violation of the Act were components of a
building, and as such owned by the building's owner). Moreover, a commentator suggests that
"the different standards of review have no discernible effect upon the manner in which the
court reviews agency decisions." TSCA: A Regulatory Morass, supra note 15, at 1157 (citing K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 29.00 (1976)). Thus, regardless of sec-
tion 19 of TSCA, a reviewing court will most likely apply the Chevron two-step formula.
18. See generally Byse, supra note 17, at 255-56 (describing the Chevron two step
analysis).
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the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given
effect."" 9 However, "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue," then step two must be applied.2°
Simply stated, step two requires the court to accept an agency's statutory
interpretation if it is "reasonable."'" In Chevron, the Court describes the
congressional delegation of authority, both explicit and implicit, which en-
ables an agency to fill statutory gaps.22 An explicit delegation results from
"an express delegation of authority to the agency," and the Court applies the
"arbitrary and capricious" test to the agency's interpretation.23 An implicit
delegation is an implied delegation, and the court applies a "reasonableness"
test.24 In application, however, the broad nature of implicit delegation25
coupled with the similarity of the "arbitrary and capricious" and "reasona-
bleness" tests, 26 simplifies the second step as to whether the agency's inter-
pretation is "reasonable."
This Comment will apply the Chevron analysis to the issue of TSCA's
standard of liability. First, the Comment will address step one of the Chev-
ron analysis: the question being whether the intent of Congress is clear?
Congressional intent will be determined through the analysis of several
sources of statutory construction: a) the plain meaning rule, b) the legisla-
tive history, c) the comparison of language within the statute, and d) the
doctrine of pari materia. Second, the Comment will determine the EPA's
interpretation of TSCA's standard of liability and the policy behind the in-
terpretation. Finally, the Comment will address step two of the Chevron
analysis: is the EPA's interpretation reasonable?
I. STEP ONE: Is THE INTENT OF CONGRESS CLEAR?
The construction of legislative intent requires an analysis of various
sources. Sources of congressional intent which support the creation of a
strict liability standard for TSCA include: a) the plain meaning rule; b) the
19. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
n.9 (1984).
20. Id. at 843.
21. Byse, supra note 17, at 256.
22. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 844.
25. See Luneburg, Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction, 2
ADMIN. L. J. 243, 24647 (1988) (stating that a source of Congressional delegation may even
be "simply legislative inattention." (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865)).
26. Id. at 246 (stating that "[i]gency views ... will be reviewed under a 'reasonableness
test,' which may not be very different, if at all, from an 'arbitrary and capricious' review."
(citations omitted)).
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legislative history; c) the comparison of the language within the statute; and
d) the doctrine of pari materia. Each will be addressed in their respective
order.
A. The Plain Meaning Rule
"The plain meaning of the words of a statute is the most persuasive evi-
dence of Congressional intent."" Section 15 of TSCA provides:
PROHIBITED ACTS
It shall be unlawful for any person to
(1) fail or refuse to comply with (A) any rule promulgated or or-
der issued under section 2603 of this title....
(3) fail or refuse to (A) establish or maintain records, (B) submit
reports, notices, or other information, or (C) permit access to
or copying of records....
(4) fail or refuse to permit entry or inspection as required by sec-
tion 2610 of this title.2"
This language expressly prohibits, regardless of negligence or intent, the fail-
ure to comply with the respective provisions of TSCA.29 At least one legal
commentator supports the argument; he states that, "scienter [is] not re-
quired for a civil violation" of TSCA.3° Thus, the plain meaning of the
TSCA's language provides strong evidence supporting the conclusion that
Congress intended to create a strict liability standard for TSCA.
B The Legislative History
An analysis of the Act's legislative history provides a second source of
evidence supporting the congressional intent to establish a strict liability
standard for TSCA.3! This analysis includes a description of: 1) the lan-
guage of early drafts of TSCA, 2) the legislative debate surrounding these
drafts, and 3) the similar interpretation of the legislative histories of other
environmental legislation.
1. Early Drafts of TSCA
Legislative consideration of TSCA began in 1972 under the 92nd Con-
27. United States v. Allen; 574 F.2d 435, 438 (8th Cir. 1978).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 2614 (1988).
29. The exception is TSCA section 15(2) which expressly establishes a "knew or should
have known" standard. 15 U.S.C. § 2614(2) (1988).
30. D. STEVER, LAW OF CHEMICAL REGULATION AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
§ 2.07(2)(a) (1986).
31. United States v. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d 368, 372 (10th Cir. 1979).
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gress. During that year, the Senate held eight days of hearings on S. 1478,
the "Toxic Substances Control Act of 1971", and, following committee ac-
tion, passed the bill with amendments on May 30, 1972.32 However, late
House action prevented a final reconciliation with the Senate.
In 1973, the House passed, with amendments, H.R. 5356, but again the
differences with the Senate proved irreconcilable.3 3 Similarities existed,
however, in both S. 1478 and H.R. 5356. Specifically, both bills contained
identical "PENALTIES" sections. These provided:
PENALTIES
Sec. 17(a): Any person who knowingly violates Sec. 16 of this Act
shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $25,000 for each
day of violation. For the purposes of this subsection, the term
"knowingly" means (1) the having of actual knowledge, or (2) the
presumed having of knowledge deemed to be possessed by a rea-
sonable man who acts in the circumstances, including knowledge
obtainable upon the exercise of due care.34
This compares to the present Act which provides:
PENALTIES
(A)Civil. (1) Any person who violates a provision of Section 2614
of this title shall be liable to the United States for a civil penalty in
an amount not to exceed $25,000 for each such violation.35
As evidenced by these two early drafts, both the Senate and the House
should have been aware of TSCA's original language which required a
knowing violation for civil penalties. Therefore, the conspicuous absence of
the "knowingly" language in the present form of the Act logically supports
the conclusion that Congress intended a strict liability standard for TSCA.
2. Legislative Debate
Language changes and the legislative debate surrounding these changes
provides evidence of congressional intent. These changes support the propo-
sition that Congress was aware that specific language establishes specific
standards. The Senate changed "knowingly" with definition in S. 1478 to
"other than willfully" in a bill proposed by the 93rd Congress, S. 426. Then,
in the amended form of S. 426, the language was returned to "knowingly,"
however, without the respective definition.36
32. S. REP. No. 698, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4491, 4503.
33. Id.
34. S. 1478, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 188 Cong. Rec. 19172 (daily ed. May 30, 1972) & H.R.
5356, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 119 Cong. Rec. 25468 (daily ed. July 23, 1973) (emphasis added).
35. TSCA § 16(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (1988).
36. S. 426 with amendments in lieu of H.R. 5356, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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The debate over these amendments provides valuable insight regarding
intent, because it illustrates what Congress intended to accomplish with
these modifications. The House debate of July 23, 1973, began with exten-
sive consideration of the term "knowingly" and its respective definition in
the "PENALTIES" section of the Bill.37 Congressman Young (R-Ill.)
raised the issue and suggested the deletion of the definition to establish the
typical common law usage of "knowingly" which requires actual knowledge,
and not a "knew or should have known" standard.3 ' However, in defense of
the bill, its sponsor, Congressman Eckhardt (D-Tx.) suggested:
that the language used in [the penalties section] ... is ameliorating
language and is more favorable language to the accused than the
language which appears in most administrative procedure bills. In
most administrative bills there is no qualification of "knowingly"
at all. That is, a violation of the act in fact, whether the person
knew it or not, and knew he was violating it or not, becomes
illegal.39
In this early draft of TSCA, Congress intended a "knowingly" or negligence
standard. Moreover, Congressman Moss (D-Ca.) supported this conclusion,
maintaining that, "the definition of 'knowingly' here undoubtedly is analo-
gous to negligence. " '
Congressman Dingell (D-Mi.), in an attempt to clarify the standards
under consideration, categorized statutory enforcement standards into three
types. He maintained:
[1] The,type which says nothing about knowingly or willful, in
which case we have the crime being consummated by the sim-
ple commission of the act ....
[2] We have the second type where we apply the word "know-
ingly," which simply means the individual intended the conse-
quences of his act ....
[3] [T]he third or the last category would apply to willful or will-
fully malicious acts .... 41
As evidenced by the congressional debate, the drafters were acutely aware of
1) the different standards of liability; 2) the language required to establish a
specific type of liability; and 3) in the early drafts of TSCA, the congres-
sional intent to create a negligence standard.
Based on an analysis of the legislative debate, the deletion of the "know-
ingly" language in the present Act supports the determination that Congress
37. Which is today's TSCA section 16, 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (1988).
38. 119 CONG. REC. 25,455 (daily ed. July 23, 1973).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 119 CONG. REC. 25,456 (daily ed. July 23, 1973).
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also intended to establish a strict liability standard. Case law also supports
this conclusion: "It is a canon of statutory construction that where ... the
words of a later statute differ from those of a previous one on the same or a
related subject, the legislature must have intended them to have a different
meaning."42  Additionally, the debate provided a logical purpose behind
Congress' subsequent replacement of the negligence standard with a strict
liability standard. Congressman Eckhart's soliloquy, which characterized
the "knowingly" standard as "ameliorating" as compared to the typical
standards of administrative statutes, suggests that Congress replaced the
weaker "knowingly" standard with a more consistent strict liability
standard.
3. The Interpretation of Other Legislative Histories
Under conditions analogous to TSCA, courts have held that section 311 of
the Clean Water Act ("CWA") utilizes a strict liability standard.43 Congress
established a "knowingly" standard in early drafts of CWA, then expressly
deleted the language from the present Act." Therefore, the conclusion that
TSCA utilizes a strict liability standard based on the express deletion of the
"knowingly" requirement is perfectly consistent with the rules of statutory
construction, case law, and the parallel judicial determination of CWA sec-
tion 311 liability.
As evidenced by CWA Section 311, a statute does not require express
strict liability language in order to establish strict liability.45 Courts have
42. Klein v. Republic Steel Corp., 435 F.2d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1970) (which found that
the 1937 amendments of the Kohler Act, which added an "in such a negligent manner" provi-
sion, established a new negligence standard for the Pennsylvania statute). See also Muscogee
(Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (The court stated: "[tihe IRA
[Indian Reorganization Act] and the OIWA [Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act] address the same
subject, albeit for different tribes, and were enacted just two years apart. It is contrary to
common sense as well as sound statutory construction to read the later, more general language
to incorporate the precise limitations of the earlier statute. Where the words of a later statute
differ from those of a previous one on the same or related subject, the Congress must have
intended them to have a different meaning."), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 795 (1989); United States
v. Crocker-Anglo National Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133, 155 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
43. See, e.g., United States v. M/V Big Sam, 681 F.2d 432, 441 (5th Cir.) (stating that,
"strict liability ... is apparent from the legislative history."), reh'g denied, 693 F.2d 451 (5th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983); Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596
F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979) (stating that, "[t]he final bill embodied the Senate's strict liability
proposal"); United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979) (stating
that the provisions of the CWA "were written without regard to intentionality ... making the
person responsible for the discharge of any pollutant strictly liable.").
44. Note, Strict Liability Under Section 311 of the Clean Water Act: Cleaning Up Respon-
deat Superior and Negligence, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 149, 150 n.9 (1985). See Steuart, 596
F.2d at 613 (discussing the legislative history of CWA liability provision).
45. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Elgin, 338 U.S. 384 (1949), reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 945 (1950).
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also interpreted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act ("CERCLA") to require strict liability without ex-
press language. In State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp. ,46 the court held
that "Congress intended that responsible parties be held strictly liable, even
though an explicit provision for strict liability [under CERCLA] was not
included."47 In light of Congressman Dingell's division of statutory stan-
dards suggesting that strict liability is established by simply "say[ing] noth-
ing about knowingly or willfully,"4 it is perfectly consistent to determine
that Congress intended a strict liability standard for TSCA, even though the
statutory language does not expressly mandate such a standard.
C. The Comparison of Language within the Statute
The comparison and analysis of the language within the statute itself pro-
vides evidence of legislative intent.49 Section 15(2) of TSCA provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to-
(2) use for commercial purposes a chemical substance or mixture
which a person knew or had reason to know was manufactured,
processed, or distributed in commerce .... "
Therefore, since Congress expressly provided a "knew or should have
known" standard in this one isolated situation, it is most likely that Con-
gress intentionally omitted this language from the other subsections for the
specific purpose of creating a strict liability standard. A rule of statutory
The Federal Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 2 (1983) states: "[i]t shall be unlawful for any
common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to haul or permit to be hauled or
used on its line any car used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling
automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going
between the ends of the cars." Id. at 387 n.2. The Court held that this language alone is
enough to establish a strict liability standard against a carrier for injuries sustained by plaintiff
because of faulty couplers. Further, the Court stated: "a failure of equipment to perform as
required by the Safety Appliance Act is in itself an actionable wrong, in no way dependent
upon negligence and for the proximate results of which there is liability - a liability that cannot
be escaped by proof of care or diligence." Id. at 390. But see PROSSER, supra note 11, at 228.
"These statutes [which establish strict liability without express language] are, however, the
exception, and in the aggregate they make up only a very small percentage of the total safety
legislation. Normally no such interpretation will be placed upon a statute, and no such conclu-
sion reached, unless the court finds that it was clearly the purpose of the legislature." Id.
46. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
47. Id. at 1042. Converse to both TSCA and CWA, the original drafts of CERCLA pos-
sessed "strict liability" language which Congress expressly deleted for a CWA section 311
standard of liability. Id. Thus, based on judicial interpretation, the court held CERCLA a
strict liability statute under more disharmonious circumstances than either TSCA or CWA.
48. 119 CONG. REC. 25,456 (daily ed. July 23, 1973).
49. City of Burbank v. General Electric Co., 329 F.2d 825, 832 (9th Cir. 1964).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 2614(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
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interpretation supports this conclusion: "[Wihere Congress has carefully em-
ployed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be im-
plied where excluded."
'51
Another example of Congress' explicit use of a fault standard is the pres-
ence of a "knowingly or willfully" standard for criminal penalties.52 In
United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., the court required a finding
of intent before a violation could be found, holding that, "if [the] defendants
did not know the capacitors contained PCBs, their convictions were im-
proper." 3 Therefore, TSCA requires a determination of actual intent to es-
tablish a knowing or willful criminal violation.
The presence of an actual knowledge standard for criminal violations,
coupled with the "knew or had reason to know" standard for civil violations
under section 2614(2), provides strong evidence that Congress was aware of
and used specific language to establish an intent-based standard of liability.
Consequently, the conspicuous absence of either "knowingly" or "knew or
had reason to know" in the TSCA section 15, "prohibited acts," subsections
(1), (3) and (4) is indicative of congressional intent to create a strict liability
standard for these subsections.
Additionally, the EPA provides valuable insight into Congress' purpose
behind the deletion of the "knowingly" requirement for civil violations in
the present Act. In response to the "knowingly" requirement, the EPA in
its capacity as Administrator stated:
In place of Section 17(a) of H.R. 5356 [which includes the "know-
ingly" requirement], we recommend the provision for civil penal-
ties provided in Section 16(b) of the Administration bill [which
does not include the "knowingly" requirement]. We consider it
inappropriate for a civil penalties provision to require that the vio-
lation charged must be established to have been committed "know-
ingly," a requirement quite appropriate in the case of criminal
violations.54
Thus, the deletion of "knowingly," as recommended by the EPA, supports
the legislative intent to create a strict liability standard for TSCA.
51. City of Burbank, 329 F.2d at 832.
52. TSCA section 16(b) states:
Any person who knowingly or willfully violates any provision of section 2614 of this
title, shall, in addition to or in lieu of any civil penalty which may be imposed under
subsection (a) of this section for such violation, be subject, upon conviction, to a fine
of not more than $25,000 for each day of violation, or to imprisonment for not more
than one year, or both.
15 U.S.C. § 2615(b)(1988) (emphasis added).
53. United States v. Pacific Hide and Fur Depot, Inc., 768 F.2d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 1985)
(discussing a criminal action under TSCA for violation of the PCB ban rule).
54. H.R. REP. No. 360, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1973).
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D. The Doctrine of Pari Materia
Under the doctrine of pari materia, legislation of similar purpose and
character can be used to determine legislative intent." This doctrine is
based on "the supposition that the several statutes were governed by one
spirit and policy, and were intended to be consistent.., in their several parts
and provisions."56 In establishing TSCA as a strict liability statute it is of
55. Historically, environmental regulation has utilized a strict liability standard. As an
ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activity, pollution (e.g., the accumulation of sewage
or smoke, dust, bad odors, noxious gases from industrial enterprises), as an absolute nuisance,
requires a strict liability standard. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 552. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit recently held in State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp. that the owner of
property, which contained a hazardous waste site, "is liable for maintenance of a public nui-
sance irrespective of negligence or fault." 759 F.2d 1032, 1051 (2d Cir. 1985). Thus, strict
liability regulation of pollution through common law nuisance remains intact, even today.
Additionally, statutory regulation of pollution traditionally uses a standard of strict liability.
An example is the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899. This Act "prohibits dis-
charging from a ship or shore installation into navigable waters of the United States or their
tributaries 'any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from
streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state.'" W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 387 (1977). Courts have upheld this Act to utilize a strict liability standard. United
States v. United States Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd, 482 F.2d 439
(7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 909 (1973). In sum, there is substantial evidence that the
interpretation of TSCA as a strict liability statute is consistent with past environmental regula-
tion.
Today, statutory environmental regulation also utilizes a strict liability standard. A long list
of strict liability legislation specifically regulating hazardous substances exists. These include:
1) The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) of 1971 (or the Clean Water Act
(CWA) as it is called today), amended by 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988). "The regulatory
provisions of the FWPCA were written without regard to intentionality,... making the person
responsible for the discharge of any pollutant strictly liable." United States v. Earth Sciences,
Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979); 2) The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75
(1988). In regards to hazardous waste site clean up, "Congress intended that responsible par-
ties be held strictly liable, even though an explicit provision for strict liability was not in-
cluded." Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1042. See also United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 186
(1987); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283 (D.R.I. 1986); 3) The Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991(1) (1988). "It is clear
Congress intended RCRA ... to impose liability without fault or negligence." Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d at 740; 4) The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), amended by 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988). See W. RODGERS, EN-
VIRONMENTAL LAW 897 (1977) (citing In re: Johnson Chem. Co., No. FIFRA-II-I IC (initial
decision Oct. 8, 1974)). The most celebrated strict liability statutes are section 311 of CWA,
which regulates oil and toxic substance spills, and CERCLA liability, which is modeled after
Section 311. See Violet, 648 F. Supp. at 1290 (citing S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 34
(1980)).
56. 73 AM. JUR. 2DStatutes § 188 (1974). See Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 649-50
(1974), reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 886 (1974) (construing a provision of the Consumer Protection
Act in light of harmonizing it with provisions of the Bankruptcy Act). "Congress did not
TSCA Liability
particular importance to compare it with CWA section 311 and CERCLA
liabilities.
CWA, CERCLA and TSCA possess analogous purposes: to protect the
public health by the regulation of hazardous substances. The purpose of
TSCA is to "regulate chemical substances and mixtures which present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment. '" Section 311 of
CWA was designed to prevent the discharge of "oil and any hazardous sub-
stances... which may be harmful to the public health or welfare."" 8 Simi-
larly, Congress enacted CERCLA to regulate cleanup, if "there is a release
or substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or con-
taminant which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the pub-
lic health or welfare." 9 Clearly, the purposes of these environmental
statutes arise under the same "spirit" and "policy" as defined by the doctrine
of pari materia and, accordingly, should be analyzed together.
In recent years, environmental legislation has attempted to increase the
regulation of toxic substances to a point which commentators suggest is
"cradle to grave" regulation.' Consequently, new legislation attempts to
unify the statutory scheme by filling in the gaps of this "cradle to grave"
regulation. Congress designed TSCA "to fill a number of regulatory gaps"
existing in the scheme of environmental regulation.6 Similarly, it has been
stated that, "CERCLA ... represents an attempt to fill gaps left by other
federal strict liability statutes - including section 311 of the CWA.' '62 It has
also been held that, there are "marked similarities in the enforcement and
enact the ... Act in a vacuum [sic] . .. [and was] well aware that the provisions and the
purposes of the Act... would have to co-exist." Id. The court also held when:
interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which
general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute (or
statutes on the same subject) and the objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its
various provisions, and give to it a construction as will carry into execution the will
of the legislature.
Id. at 650. See also SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating that
"in the absence of convincing evidence that different statutory provisions were intended, inter-
related interpretations should be given a harmonious construction"), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913
(1983); See Eskridge, Public Values In Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007, 1039
(1989).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (1988).
58. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(4) (1988).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(l)(B) (1988).
60. See, e.g., Goldfarb, The Hazards of Our Hazardous Waste Policy, 19 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 249, 256 (1979).
61. S. REP No. 698, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. i, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 4491, 4491.
62. Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1290 (D.R.I. 1986) (citing S. REP No. 848, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1980)).
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policy provisions underlying the TSCA and.., the FWPCA [or CWA].
' 63
As required by the unified nature of environmental legislation, the determi-
nation of legislative intent regarding TSCA should be analyzed in light of
and within the context of related legislation. Consequently, based on the
established strict liability standards of both CWA section 311 and CERCLA,
the conclusion that TSCA utilizes a strict liability standard is consistent with
the intent of Congress and the doctrine of pari materia.
Based on the strict liability provisions of the other related statutes, a de-
termination that TSCA uses a negligence standard would be an anomaly in
the scheme of environmental regulation. This anomaly, however, exists at
the administrative level. As evidenced by the Huth decision, the EPA does
not uniformly implement TSCA as a strict liability statute. 6 Because of this
anomaly and the judicial deference given to the decision-making of adminis-
trative agencies, a complete analysis of TSCA liability in the courts must
include a discussion of EPA's interpretation of TSCA's standard of liability.
II. WHAT Is THE EPA's INTERPRETATION OF TSCA's STANDARD OF
LIABILITY AND THE POLICY BEHIND IT?
Beyond the recommendation of the EPA to establish a strict liability stan-
dard in the early drafts of TSCA,65 the EPA's interpretation as the adminis-
trator of environmental legislation carries considerable weight in judicial
decisions. Therefore, a determination of EPA's interpretation of the stan-
dard of liability of TSCA is critical to judicial review.
"Agency views regarding statutory issues may be formulated as part of
either 'formal' or 'informal' agency processes. The first includes rulemaking
and adjudication functions and the latter encompasses interpretations con-
tained in, for example, letter rulings and internal agency directives and
guidelines.",
66
A. The EPA's Interpretation
The first "formal" process to analyze is EPA rulemaking. The EPA's
codification of TSCA narrowly supports a strict liability standard for provi-
sions regulating PCBs. EPA regulations define a "PCB Item... as any PCB
Article, PCB Article Container, PCB Container or PCB Equipment, that
63. Welch v. Schneider Nat. Bulk Carriers, 676 F. Supp. 571, 578 (D.N.J. 1987) (sug-
gesting a general similarity in TSCA and CWA enforcement provisions and policy). However,
the most frequent comparison is limited to the citizen suit provisions. See Adams v. Republic
Steel Corp., 621 F. Supp. 370, 376 (W.D. Tenn. 1985).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
65. See supra text accompanying note 54.
66. Luneburg, supra note 25, at 244.
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deliberately or unintentionally contains or has a part of it any PCB or
PCBs."6 7 Accordingly, intent is not a requirement when establishing a
"PCB Item."
The language of this definition also led to the establishment of TSCA as a
strict liability statute in the second "formal" process, adjudication. In Conti-
nental Plastic Containers,6" the AD determined that even if the defendant
"did not know or suspect that the fluid.., contained PCB's in excess of 50
ppm, . . . [it does] not constitute a defense to charges of violations."69
However, not all administrative decisions are consistent, as evidenced by
Huth, where the ALJ held that the owner of land which contained storage
tanks in violation of TSCA was not liable based on the owner's lack of intent
to violate.7 ° Suburban Station7 1 also supports the Huth position. In this
decision the City of Philadelphia, which performed the actual PCB clean-up,
was liable for clean-up violations, while SEPTA, the transportation author-
ity which owned the contaminated property, was not liable.7 2 The ALJ ad-
judicating for the EPA stated that, "[i]n order to impose strict liability on
SEPTA for wrongs committed by its licensee, there must be an indication
that Congress specifically intended this result .... That indication of intent
by Congress ... is simply missing here."'73 As evidenced by these decisions,
67. 40 C.F.R. § 761.3 (1988) (emphasis added).
68. In re Continental Plastic Containers, No. TSCA-PCB-84-0014 (final decision Sept. 30,
1987).
69. Id. at 5. See also In re Hodag Chemical Corp., No. TSCA-V-C-025-88 (initial decision
Nov. 16, 1988), at 17 (stating that "[r]espondent's contention that it is not liable because the
violations were unknowing violations is not supported by the statute, its legislative history or
precedent thereunder"); see generally Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 636 F.2d
1267, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing EPA's establishment of a 50 ppm (parts per million)
PCB level to exclude widespread ambient sources of PCB's from regulation).
70. In re Huth, No. TSCA-V-C-196 (initial decision June 2, 1986), at 25-26. See supra text
accompanying notes 1-5.
71. In re Suburban Station, No. TSCA-III-40 (initial decision Sept. 4, 1984).
72. Id. at 17.
73. Id. at 16-17. However, a discussion of the "innocent landowner" defense is war-
ranted, because both Huth and Suburban Station question the applicability of strict liability to
landowners. The court in United States v. Bums, 512 F. Supp. 916, 921 (W.D. Pa. 1981),
indirectly suggests that this defense may be applicable by law. This case involved the illegal
disposal of PCBs under TSCA. Defendants in this case argued that as "innocent absentee
landlords... they are not within the reach of the statutory language as a matter of law." Id.
However, the court rejected the motion to dismiss, and stated that "[t]he extent of the ...
defendants' involvement with Burns [the tenant who disposed of the PCBs] is disputed and
must be resolved at trial." Id. Therefore, the Burns' court implies that simple ownership -
which would be enough under a strict liability standard - may not be enough to establish
liability by law, and that more facts regarding the involvement of the landowners in a TSCA
violation would be required.
The defendants' in Burns argue that they are not within the "statutory language" as a matter
of law. Although the opinion does not expressly discuss the issue, it is likely that the argument
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the EPA interpretation of TSCA liability is in a state of confusion, with
some evidence narrowly supporting strict liability in EPA rulemaking, and a
split of decisions existing in the adjudicatory forum.
The "informal" processes, which establish an Agency's interpretation of a
statute, include internal guidelines.74 The EPA in Guidelines for the Assess-
ment of Civil Penalties under Section 16 of TSCA; PCB Penalty Policy
provides:
Since the law only requires the Agency to consider the culpability
of the violator as an adjustment factor, the existence of a violation
can be established without relying solely on this "blame worthi-
ness" factor. In other words, the Agency may pursue a policy of
strict liability in penalizing for a violation, though some allowance
must be made based on the extent of the violator's culpability.75
arises from the omission of "owner or operator" liability language in TSCA. Instead, the
relevant liability provisions utilizes "person." See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2614 (1988). The ALJ in
Suburban Station relied on this omission to discharge the liability of the landowner, SEPTA,
from a TSCA violation directly performed by its licensee. In re Suburban Station, No. TSCA-
111-40, at 16 (initial decision Sept. 4, 1986) (stating that "[nleither TSCA, nor the PCB Ban
Rule, contain any definition of 'owner or operator,' which would indicate that the statute or
regulation was intended to impose . . . liability on owners of property without regard to
whether they had in any way caused the violation."). However, regardless of the omission the
court in Burns continued to rely on the EPA interpretation, and stated that "it is... likely that
Congress intended PCB regulations to be limited to owners and operators." Burns, 512 F.
Supp. at 919. Thus, an "innocent landowner" falls within the reach of the regulations, but
may escape liability by proving the affirmitive defense of "innocence."
An important factor to consider, however, is that Congress has expressly provided for the
"innocent landowner" defense in other related environmental legislation. For example, under
section 107 of CERCLA, innocent landowners may escape liability where "the act or omission
of a third party" who is not an "employee or agent of the defendant," or not in a "contractual
relationship" with the defendant causes the release of hazardous substances on the landowner's
property. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1321(g) (1988) (providing for a
third party defense under CWA); see generally Anderson, Will the Meek Even Want the
Earth?, 38 MERCER L. REV. 535 (discussing the "innocent landowner" defense in a broad
range of contexts). Moreover, TSCA in regards to PCBs is consistent with the purposes of
both CWA and CERCLA - the cleanup of hazardous waste. Under TSCA section 6(e)(l)(B),
EPA is required to provide regulations for the "disposal" of PCBs. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B)
(1988). This "disposal" mandates the proper cleanup and removal of leaks and spills. See 40
C.F.R. § 761.60(b)(2) (1988) (providing that "PCBs resulting from the clean-up and removal
of spills, leaks, and other uncontrolled discharge, must be stored and disposed of."); see also
United States v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20187 (N.D.
I11. 1985) (requiring the cleanup of PCBs from ruptured capacitors under TSCA § 6(e)). Sig-
nificantly, under the "third party" defenses of both CERCLA and CWA the "innocent land-
owners" in Burns, Huth and Suburban Station could not escape liability. Therefore, it is
arguably improper for courts to establish defenses to liability under TSCA where Congress did
not expressly establish a defense, and which are inconsistent with the scheme of environmental
regulation.
74. Luneburg, supra note 25, at 244.
75. 45 Fed. Reg. 59,770 (1980) (emphasis added).
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Based on this guideline, culpability plays a role in the amount of the penalty,
but not in determining liability, where the applicable standard is no fault or
strict liability.
In sum, EPA's interpretation of TSCA's standard of liability generally
supports the application of strict liability, with the conspicuous exception of
several adjudicatory decisions. To more fully understand the Agency's in-
terpretive process, a discussion of the underlying policy considerations is
valuable.
B. Policy Considerations
The Court in Chevron stated that "policy arguments are more properly
addressed to legislators or administrators, not to judges.",7 6 The Court rele-
gated its role to ensuring that an EPA interpretation is "a reasonable policy
choice for the Agency to make . . ."" Therefore, although the Court will
not make the policy choice, it will determine if the policy is reasonable. This
section describes some policy considerations involved in the interpretation of
TSCA's standard of liability. These considerations revolve around economic
and justice concerns.
1. Economic Concerns
The first policy consideration is economic. Welfare economists rely on a
basic premise of microeconomic theory: "that markets will efficiently allo-
cate resources only if prices reflect all the costs of doing business." 78 There-
fore, if the application of strict liability requires a business to consider a
greater percentage of the total costs of production in their product prices,
then strict liability will increase economic efficiency.
The application of strict liability to environmental harms shifts non-negli-
gent injury costs to the defendant, increasing cost internalization.79 Cost
internalization increases economic efficiency by requiring producers to estab-
lish consumer prices that better reflect all the costs of doing business.8" Cost
internalization also increases efficiency by increasing production costs.
76. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864
(1984).
77. Id. at 845.
78. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 14, at 636.
79. Id.
80. Id. But see id. at 637. All external costs, however, are not negative and it would be
difficult to apply these to the cost of doing business Id. "Industrial facilities almost invariably
generate positive externalities (benefits not captured through product prices) such as employ-
ment, family health care, and participation in community activities. Imposing strict liability
on the defendant may cause it to shut down or reduce operations, resulting in the loss of these
positive externalities." Id.
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These increased costs encourage producers or "disrupters of the environ-
mental quality... to compare the costs of damage payments with the costs
of abating the environmental pollution by switching product lines ... or by
reducing the level of use of damaging product inputs and product
processes." 8 1  This increases efficiency because producers of potentially dan-
gerous products are generally the "part[ies] best able to make a cost benefit
analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance costs and then to act
on that analysis."
'12
In a more practical vein, the application of strict liability increases eco-
nomic efficiency regardless of cost internalization. "Courts and parties can
reduce transaction costs by focusing on causation and the measure of dam-
ages and eliminating the inquiry into fault. .... "'I The EPA, by applying a
strict liability standard and reducing transaction costs, encourages the max-
imization of the Agency's limited resources. 84 Therefore, the EPA by adopt-
ing a strict liability standard 1) promotes both "accident prevention ... and
the elimination of the necessity for proving negligence;" 85 2) decreases the
cost of a TSCA enforcement case; and 3) increases resources for additional
enforcement cases or other pressing environmental problems.
Another result of a strict liability standard is increased insurance coverage
for environmental harms. At least one court supports the application of
strict liability because it "practically ensure[s] that enterprises would obtain
liability insurance to cover any environmental disruption they might
81. Id. at 636. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 163 (3d ed.
1986) [hereinafter POSNER] (stating that "[i]f a class of activities can be identified in which
activity-level changes by potential injurers [such as environmental disrupters] appear to be the
most efficient method for accident prevention, there is a strong argument for imposing strict
liability on the people engaged in those activities.").
82. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 14, at 636. See POSNER, supra note 81, at
166 (describing information costs in the context of product liability). "Strict liability in effect
impounds information about products hazards into the price of the product ...." Id.
83. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 14, at 636. See generally POSNER, supra
note 81, at 528-29.
Since strict liability eliminates a major issue in tort litigation, that of the care exer-
cised by each party, the amount of uncertainty involved in predicting the outcome of
litigation if the claim is not settled would be reduced; and a reduction in uncertainty
concerning the outcome of the litigation should reduce the fraction of claims that go
to trial. Simplification of issues might also lead to a reduction in the cost of each
trial....
Id. However, strict liability would also "lead to increase in the number of injury claims, be-
cause the scope of liability would be greater." Id. at 528.
84. "The limited resources available to any Agency demand that those resources be uti-
lized in a manner that will produce the maximum benefit." Note, Superior Air Products, Inc. v.
NL Industries, Inc.: An Economic Efficiency Approach To New Jersey's Environmental Cleanup
Responsibilities Act, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 363, 381 (1988).
85. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 693.
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cause." 6 By increasing insurance coverage, the cost of insurance premiums
rises which requires that the producer shift the additional premium costs to
the consumer by increasing product and/or service prices. Therefore, more
costs are internalized again increasing economic efficiency.8 7
2. Justice Concerns
The second policy consideration is justice. However, the first aspect of
this consideration is closely related to economic concerns. Cost internaliza-
tion, a consequence of a strict liability standard, supports justice; it requires
that those who benefit from a dangerous activity or product pay for the inju-
ries that are inflicted on the public and environment (e.g., the company
through decreased profits and the consumer through increased prices).88
Beyond economic concerns, corrective justice supports the application of a
strict liability standard to environmental statutes.8 9
The doctrine of strict liability at its core reflects the judgment that
even if some harm is inevitable, the social value of some enterprises
is greater than their costs, but if an enterprise's benefits exceed its
costs, fundamental fairness requires at least that profits be net of
any harm inflicted.9°
This concept, that those who benefit from an activity must pay for the harms
that they inflict, it has been argued, must in fairness be imposed regardless of
economic efficiency.91
However, as a commentator suggests, fairness "cuts two ways."92 When a
negligence standard replaces a strict liability standard, "[t]he best justifica-
tion that can be offered for the fault [or negligence] principle is the assertion
that most people believe it is fair."9 3 A fault standard is considered fair
because liability arises through culpability, not through the mere uninten-
tional actions of the defendant.
Under TSCA, however, culpability is a mitigating factor in the assessment
of penalties, and plays an important role in establishing a "fair" result in





91. Id. See also PROSSER, supra note 11, at 537. "The courts have tended to lay stress
upon the fact that the defendant is acting for his own purposes, and is seeking a benefit... from
such activities, and that he is in a better position to administer the unusual risk by passing it on
to the public than is the innocent victim." Id.
92. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 14, at 637.
93. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 609; See also ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note
14, at 637 (suggesting that strict liability seems fairest when liability is imposed on a faultless
but profit making enterprise where a faultless but injured natural person is involved).
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light of the stringent standard of strict liability. Congress intended to estab-
lish culpability as a mitigating factor, rather than an element of liability.
94
Section 16(b) of TSCA provides:
In determining the amount of a civil penalty, the Administrator
shall take into account the nature, circumstances, extent, and grav-
ity of the violation or violations and, with respect to the violator,
ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do business, any his-
tory of such prior violations, the degree of culpability, and other
such matters as justice may require. 95
Thus, by requiring culpability to play a role in the assessment of penalties,
Congress minimizes the "unfair" affects of a strict liability standard.
In sum, policy considerations support the application of a strict liability
standard, based on both an increase in economic efficiency and the support
of justice considerations.
III. STEP Two: Is THE EPA's INTERPRETATION OF TSCA's
STANDARD OF LIABILITY REASONABLE?
Step one of the Chevron analysis considers the intent of Congress. If the
intent is clear, a court's review is finished and the congressional intent is
given effect. 96 After a review of congressional intent, most evidence supports
the establishment of a strict liability standard for TSCA. However, arguing
in the alternative, if a court does not find that "Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue," 97 the court must apply step two of the
Chevron analysis. 98 Step two requires the court to determine whether Con-
gress delegated interpretive authority to the EPA, and if so, whether the
interpretation is reasonable. 99
Chevron suggests two types of congressional delegation of authority, ex-
plicit and implicit. 1  The first, explicit, requires the "express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation."' '° Clearly, in the case at hand, Congress did not delegate ex-
press authority to EPA to establish TSCA's standard of liability in either the
statutory language or legislative history.
However, a determination of implicit delegation under Chevron is prob-
94. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(B) (1988).
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984).
97. Id. at 842.
98. Id. at 843.
99. Id. at 843-44.
100. Id. at 844.
101. Id. at 843-44.
TSCA Liability
able. The Court in Chevron describes a broad range of reasons for implicit
delegation:
Perhaps . . . [Congress] consciously desired the administrator to
strike the balance at this level, thinking that those with great ex-
pertise and charged with the responsibility of administering the
provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply
did not consider the question at this level; ... [or] perhaps Con-
gress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question,
and those on each side decided to take their chances with the
scheme devised by the agency. For judicial purposes, it matters
not which of these things occurred.'
0 2
With the door to implicit delegation left wide open by the Court, EPA ap-
parently has the authority to interpret TSCA's standard of liability, absent
the clear intent of Congress. The only hurdle remaining for judicial defer-
ence would be the test for "reasonableness."
The Court in Chevron stated that if an agency's interpretation "represents
a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that [are] committed to
the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears
from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one
that the Congress would have sanctioned."' 10 3 Accordingly, agency interpre-
tations are "reasonable," unless they are "manifestly contrary to the stat-
ute."' 104 However, in the case at hand, the current interpretation of the EPA
is unclear.' The question arises, which EPA interpretation, strict liability
or negligence, will be applied to the "reasonableness" test?
Clearly, based on the construction of legislative intent, if the EPA's inter-
pretation of strict liability is put to the test, it will be found to be reasonable,
and in no way "manifestly contrary" to the statute. However, if the EPA's
interpretation of negligence is tested', the result is not as clear.
Arguably, congressional intent is not clear enough to give strict liability
effect without-agency interpretation. However, this intent, which is support-
ive of strict liability, may be enough to show a negligence standard is "mani-
102. Id. at 865.
103. Id. at 845 (citations omitted). Congress established policy guidelines in section 2 of
TSCA, which provide that EPA "shall consider the environmental, economic, and social im-
pact of any action ... [EPA] takes or proposes to take." 15 U.S.C. § 2601(c) (1988). See supra
text accompanying notes 77-96 (discussing several aspects of the policy under these
guidelines).
104. Id. at 844.
105. See id. at 838. The court in Chevron states: "[tIhe fact that the EPA has from time to
time changed its interpretation of the term "source" does not lead to the conclusion that no
deference should be accorded the EPA's interpretation of the statute." Id. Thus, if the current
interpretation is clear, but contrary to previous interpretations, judicial deference is still
afforded.
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festly contrary to the statute." Thus, the vehicle which reaches the court for
review, whether rulemaking or adjudication, and its interpretation of
TSCA's liability, will be critical to a court decision. Even in light of the
evidence supporting strict liability, if an adjudicatory decision supporting a
negligence standard reaches a court for review, it is plausible that judicial
deference under Chevron may uphold it. This anomalous result would re-
quire the question to be posed, as a commentator describing judicial defer-
ence aptly stated: "[a]re agencies right when they are wrong?"'
1 6
CONCLUSION
This Comment addresses the question - what is the correct standard of
TSCA liability? The analysis reveals that due to unclear statutory language
and inconsistent agency decisions, the question is unresolved. A second
question naturally follows - what will TSCA liability be when it reaches the
courts? The answer is more certain, but far from absolute. Based on the
application of Chevron, the likely result of a court decision would be a strict
liability standard for TSCA. However, the application of judicial deference
to an agency decision condemning strict liability could quite possibly result
in a negligence standard. Thus, a third question is the only one truly re-
solved - what should TSCA liability be? Clearly, based on the persuasive
evidence of Congressional intent, the history and current scheme of environ-
mental regulation, and the support of policy considerations, TSCA liability
should be strict liability.
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